

WHY "SPY" AGENCIES ARE BEING SHAKEN UP

Drastic changes are aimed at ending rivalries and improving the usefulness of U. S. intelligence. One result: Some inner workings are being disclosed.

The supersecret U. S. intelligence apparatus is being rocked from within on a scale never before so visible to the public.

What set off the tremor is a major overhaul, now in progress, of the machinery that produces the worldwide intelligence assessments on which crucial national decisions are based.

Under James R. Schlesinger, the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and overseer, also, of the vast U. S. information-gathering network—military as well as civilian—significant changes are being made. They have these objectives:

- To shake up the whole system and sharply improve its usefulness to the President and his top advisers.
- To process vital intelligence more effectively, at less cost.

Mr. Schlesinger cracked down on CIA, his home base, first. Now he is expected to focus on other parts of the intelligence community—military and civilian.

Payroll reductions. In the reorganization process, wholesale firings have occurred at the CIA—a cutback, sources say, of perhaps more than 1,000 of the agency's estimated 15,000 employees.

Some professionals assert that Mr. Schlesinger is bent on rooting out an "intellectually arrogant" clique that has been riding high in the CIA hierarchy for years.

Others counter that the chief purpose of the housecleanings is to enable the Nixon Administration to "politicize" the intelligence mechanism to its own ideological shape—and use Mr. Schlesinger to do it.

Both charges are vigorously denied by responsible people on all sides. Instead, the charges are cited as examples of the bitter bureaucratic infighting going on in Washington—and spreading into the intelligence system.

On one front, heated feuding between the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency—DIA—is out in the open.

Pentagon intelligence specialists, trying to regain control of assessing military threats to the U. S., are citing what they characterize as examples of blunders and bias by the CIA.

The military critics admit that their own mistakes a decade and more ago obliged the Government to turn to the civilian CIA for the main assessments on military threats. But now, the military men contend that DIA has been revamped, is more objective—and less of a lobby designed to scare Congress into voting higher defense budgets.

Against that background of turbulence, Mr. Schlesinger is moving to carry out the sweeping reorganization of the U. S. intelligence community originally ordered by President Nixon a year and a half ago—in November, 1971.

Knowledgeable sources say that Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was replaced by Mr. Schlesinger as CIA Director because he failed to carry out the overhaul mandate to Mr. Nixon's satisfaction.

A top man in the intelligence network put it this way: "The President and his national-security adviser, Henry Kissinger, just didn't think they were getting their money's worth."


The reorganization plan, in fact, is Mr. Schlesinger's own handiwork. He drafted it while serving as Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Later, he was named Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission—the job from which he was transferred to his present post as America's "superspy."

Like Mr. Helms before him, Mr. Schlesinger is not only Director of the CIA but also Director of Central Intelligence—DCI. That makes him boss of all American intelligence operations.

New faces. One thing that Mr. Schlesinger has done is to put together what he calls the intelligence community staff, with offices on the top floor of the CIA headquarters building in a Virginia suburb of Washington.

Significantly, two military-intelligence

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE NETWORK AND WHAT IT DOES




James Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, presides over the U. S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities.

Represented on the board are—

CIA


Central Intelligence Agency, top-secret Government organization, responsible only to the White House, collects and evaluates intelligence information, runs clandestine missions abroad, conducts espionage and counterespionage.



CIA Director James R. Schlesinger, who oversees all U. S. intelligence, designated two military men among deputies.



Maj. Gen. Lew Allen



Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham

experts have been assigned to that staff as Mr. Schlesinger's deputies. One is Maj. Gen. Lew Allen, of the Air Force, who has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general. The other is Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, of the Army, a career intelligence officer.

General Graham, who has been deputy director for estimates in the Pentagon's DIA, sounded a call in an article he wrote recently for "Army" magazine advocating reassertion of a dominant role for the military in estimating security threats. May 1 was set as the date of his move to Mr. Schlesinger's staff.

As the shake-up of the intelligence establishment continues, charges and countercharges are giving Americans a rare look at its inner workings and hot rivalries. For example—

- Military men are alleging that "bias" of top-level CIA evaluators colors final estimates sent on to the President and his aides.

One case cited by a critic of the CIA:

"An estimate entitled 'New Order in Brazil' was prepared as a basis for

policy decisions. Use of the term 'New Order' in the title was like overprinting a Nazi swastika on the cover. It painted the blackest possible picture of the present Brazilian Government, making Brazil look like an imminent threat to the U. S. If the President had acted on that report, he would have cut all aid to Brazil."

- The CIA is accused of failing to use information it had in hand to alert the White House to Russia's acute food shortage last year. The point made is that the Soviets were able to negotiate a billion-dollar grain deal with the U. S. on terms favorable to the Kremlin—and unfavorable to the American housewife, who had to pay more for bread.

The CIA answers this charge by contending that the information was passed along to the Department of Agriculture, which, in the CIA view, failed to act on it promptly enough.

- A military intelligence official says that before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the CIA director of estimates offered a report prepared for the President saying there would be no invasion. An aide, disagreeing, used various stratagems to avoid forwarding the report. The delay prevented embarrassment for the CIA when the Russians did invade, but, according to the

source, the aide who blocked the erroneous estimate "won no friends."

- In Vietnam, it is now revealed, CIA and DIA were often at odds. For instance, they agreed that some Communist arms were reaching South Vietnam through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville, but both were "wildly wrong" on how much. But an official, not in intelligence, recalls that CIA was "much further wrong" than DIA—although each was on the low side.

- Another charge by critics of the CIA: After the Tet offensive of 1968, CIA reported Communists had seized vast portions of the countryside, because contact was lost with most sources outside the cities. This assumption was disproved by on-the-spot checks by DIA teams in helicopters.

An illustration of conflict between civilian and military analysts:

In a recent national estimate, the CIA took the position that Japan would never consider arming itself with nuclear weapons. The DIA argued that the Japanese were keeping abreast of nuclear technology and would not hesitate to "go nuclear" if Tokyo felt that was necessary for survival.

When the document was brought to Mr. Schlesinger, an insider says, the CIA analysts emphasized that they had put their views first, as the current position, and the DIA estimates were relegated to the back pages. Mr. Schlesinger was said to have "hit the roof" and to have ordered that the military view be given equal prominence.

- General Graham, in his writing in "Army" magazine, admits serious DIA shortcomings in the past. He charges that Pentagon intelligence has damaged its own status by inflating its estimates of threats to the "worst case" possible—

(continued on next page)

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency, co-ordinating intelligence efforts of Army, Navy and Air Force, assesses armed forces and weapons of friend and foe.

NSA

National Security Agency codes and decodes U. S. messages, breaks foreign codes, monitors foreign communications, conducts electronic surveillance.

I&R


State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research makes sure final intelligence estimates take account of political and economic trends abroad.

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission detects and monitors nuclear tests by other countries, gathers information on their nuclear capabilities.

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts counterespionage within U. S., combats sabotage, subversion.



—Wide World Photo

Overhaul of U. S. intelligence network is creating tension at CIA's massive headquarters near Washington.

"SPY" SHAKE-UP

[continued from preceding page]

in order to get more money from Congress. He claims that this tendency has been largely eliminated.

• General Graham also charges that, in the past, military intelligence has been too prone to tailor its assessments to the need "users" have for intelligence that "supports the program."

Assessing blame. In some instances, blame is being heaped upon both civilian and military intelligence agencies. One thing pointed out is that the entire U. S. intelligence community—despite warnings from some agents—refused to believe that Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev would dare to risk putting offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Khrushchev did just that, however, and the "missile crisis" resulted.

Some of the military intelligence experts now insisting on a stronger voice in the evaluation of raw data concede that, in the past, the armed forces have been supplied with exaggerated estimates of the Soviet threat—such as the "missile gap" of a decade ago that turned out to be nonexistent.

It is pointed out, however, that the DIA has had a thorough housecleaning in recent years.

"Time to reassert." In his article for "Army" magazine, General Graham wrote:

"... I think the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the 'missile gap' days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates."

Many CIA professionals in top and middle ranks are unhappy about the

reorganization. A comment typical of this viewpoint:

"What is happening is that those who seek to present intelligence as it is, rather than as the situation is seen by those supporting specific policies, are being plucked out."

Aides of Mr. Schlesinger deny that he has any intention of "politicizing" the agency. They point out that at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee he said he was determined to maintain the independence and integrity of intelligence evaluations.

Within the Nixon Administration, dissatisfaction with the CIA has centered particularly in the National Security Council staff, which is under the direction of Mr. Kissinger.

The main complaint has been that evaluations of raw intelligence often reflected the biases of top men.

To that, one CIA man retorts:

"We feel that we do a better job of evaluating raw intelligence without bias than the military does—or, for that matter, than people like Kissinger who are defending a specific policy."

The argument is made that—particularly since the days when the late Allen Dulles was its Director—the CIA's "controlling voice" in the intelligence community has sought intelligence estimates unaffected by the policies of the Administration in power, the Pentagon, the so-called military-industrial complex, or any other group.

Changes in the works. Whatever the merits of the arguments now boiling, drastic changes are being made by Mr. Schlesinger.

They include:

1. To reduce costs, overlapping intelligence agencies are to submit "bids" on operations that are assigned by President Nixon and the National Security Council. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, set up under the 1971 reorganization plan, is to consider the competing "bids" and accept the least expensive if the bidder can convince the Committee that his agency can do the job.

2. Mr. Schlesinger is making it clear that he will exercise fully his authority over all of the intelligence services. In the past, this has been a difficult problem for the Director of Central Intelligence, because the Defense Department gets most of the money and most of the manpower.

3. As DCI, Mr. Schlesinger will decide which of the U. S. intelligence agencies—military and civilian—will carry out operations assigned by the White House.

4. Each agency is to be kept fully aware of what all the others are doing. Cost experts are combing through all operations to determine how to use fewer men and spend less money.

"To be continued." Some projects are being phased out as inefficient or outmoded. One report indicated a sharp curtailment in clandestine operations. But an insider commented:

"They may not talk about these as much as they did, but like it or not, those activities are part of the way of life in the world today, and they will be continued."

One revision put into effect by Mr. Schlesinger has to do with preparation of CIA reports requested by the President and other high officials.

Condensed intelligence. Previously, such requests were answered with detailed studies—20, 30, or even 50 pages long. Now, the reports run no longer than three double-spaced pages. A CIA official explained:

"Instructions from Schlesinger are to answer the questions asked—and no more. No background. No historical discussion. Just keep in mind that the President or the Secretary of the Treasury or whoever else asks the questions is a busy man. He rarely has time to read long reports. What he needs is for use right now—today—in order to make a decision."

The telephone number of the analyst or working group responsible for the report appears on the document, so if more information is needed, it can be obtained without delay.

In line with Mr. Nixon's efforts to reduce federal spending, the intelligence agencies are under orders to reduce costs.

Just how much is being spent to piece together the information essential to national security is not a matter of public knowledge.

A 6.2 billion cost? Senator William Proxmire (Dem.), of Wisconsin, estimated recently that the cost of gathering military and civilian intelligence is 6.2 billion dollars a year. But Albert C. Hall, Assistant Defense Secretary for Intelligence, said that Mr. Proxmire's figure is "just plain wrong."

Without hinting at the actual figures, Mr. Hall said that the Pentagon's intelligence budget has been cut by about a third in the last three years.

Other sources say that manpower in the CIA and the other intelligence services, including the National Security Agency, now totals less than 125,000—a reduction of more than 25,000 since 1971.

Thus, a money crunch and diminished manpower are added problems at a time of sharp change and open conflict for the agencies which function as the "eyes and ears" of the United States around the world.

[END]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, April 28, 1973 E 31

Bureaucracy Engulfs Wounded Knee

By Jack Anderson

The bureaucratic build-up outside Wounded Knee is a testament to the government's way of doing things. No less than 400 federal officials have descended upon the small South Dakota village to negotiate, mediate, consult and occasionally exchange gunfire with the Indian occupiers. Cost to the taxpayers: around \$2.7 million.

Yet at this writing, the Indians remain armed and angry.

Take the problem of roadblocks, for example. The daily crisis reports from Wounded Knee, intended for Justice Department eyes only, tell how armed local residents threw up their own vigilante roadblock. Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger "met with them at the roadblock shortly after it was established but failed to talk it down," declares a crisis report.

Next day, the vigilante group refused to allow the Community Relations Service's peace-keeping team into Wounded Knee, while "no CRS personnel were in Wounded Knee" to restrain the militants, a "most serious incident" took place. According to a report, the incident "involved the alleged looting of a rancher's home and cattle by WK (Wounded Knee) occupants." Three days later serious shooting broke out, and

one militant Indian was critically injured.

Still, Pottinger took no action against the unauthorized roadblock. "Pottinger has indicated to CRS and at staff briefings," states a report, "that he is inclined to arrest the leaders of the roadblock, but most other agencies advise against it for purposes of public relations or convenience."

Explaining what is meant by "convenience," the report tells of "a planned march on WK by clergymen and others (Easter) weekend. The government would rather have the marchers detained by a citizens' roadblock than by an FBI one."

The Easter march fizzled, and Pottinger finally ordered the roadblock removed. But meanwhile, he was having trouble with the government's own roadblocks. He obtained an order from Washington to put all federal roadblocks and bunkers under the command of U.S. marshals.

"Previously," notes a report, "the marshals, the FBI and the BIA police each manned their own units, and it was difficult to verify and control the repeated incidents of federal vehicles and troops (mostly FBI and BIA police) moving into the WK perimeter."

The CRS peace-keeping team has now returned to Wounded Knee. But the Indians and the federal officers are still manning their armed bunkers. As one federal offi-

cial put it, "We're now back to zero again."

Military Martinet

Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham, a short, ramrod-straight authoritarian, is moving from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Central Intelligence Agency to take charge of strategic estimates.

He has already alarmed CIA hands by writing in Army Magazine that vital security estimates should be made by military analysts, although he acknowledges that DIA estimates have been slanted in the past to please the Pentagon bosses and the CIA estimates have been more accurate.

The alarm hasn't been allayed any by reports reaching CIA headquarters of his conduct as head of the Wakefield (Va.) High School PTA.

He circulated a memo, for example, urging that five teachers be fired and eight others be enlisted as informers. He wanted them to keep an eye on suspicious teachers and students. The Graham faction also brought pressure to oust the school's able principal, who finally left voluntarily.

In one stormy PTA meeting after another, Graham has fought student privileges including the right to participate fully in PTA activities. So vehement is he at PTA meetings that some neighborhood government officials are afraid to argue with him for fear he'll retaliate against

them in their jobs. In response to our inquiries, Graham sent word through his secretary that he wouldn't speak with us.

Inside North Korea—Visitors just back from North Korea remind us that Kim Il Sung's Red regime is still one of the most oppressive on earth. They describe the towns as drab, the social life as sterile, the people as regimented and the atmosphere as harsh. Individually, the North Koreans were friendly and curious. But in the presence of others, they became stiff and strident. Their private opinions suddenly conformed to the rigid official line. North and South Korean delegations, meanwhile, are preparing for another round of negotiations.

Sikkim Strife—Hush-hush reports smuggled out of the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim charge that India is financing riots against the regime of King Palden Thondup Namgyal as part of a plot to take full control of his land. The dashing king became a special favorite of Americans when he married a pretty New Yorker, Hope Cooke. Lately, demonstrations have shaken his monarchy, and Indian troops have crossed the border "in the interest of law and order." Insiders close to the royal family have gotten word to us that, even as the troops moved in, Indian political officer K.S. Bajpai began to pressure the king to "hand over all power" to India.

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ARMY

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Is the Army
losing its
responsibility?

Strategic Intelligence

Estimating The Threat: A Soldier's Job

In his landmark book, *The Soldier and the State*, Professor Samuel P. Huntington draws our attention to an extremely important and sometimes neglected fact:

The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. . . .

So, the reason for the existence of our armed forces is to counter threats to our security, and the function, composition and size of those forces depend on the perception of threats by the national leadership. If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national security, it surrenders much of its influence in decisions about military strategy, military force structure and the nature of its own armaments.

We have in the past ten years come perilously close to losing this vital role. The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of Defense was progressively weakened between 1960 and 1970, and the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military intelligence became progressively more dominant. The military budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence collection, but the key intelligence judgments derived from this costly effort were for the most part made in other agencies.

This situation can be too easily dismissed as the result of bureaucratic maneuvering, of "whiz kids" ignoring military advice, or of the general growth of anti-military sentiment in and out of government. The fact is that the muting of the military voice in military intelligence was largely of our own doing. Military professionals—both users and producers of intelligence—through failure to understand the strategic intelligence function, downgrading of the role of intelligence in general and sometimes abusing the intelligence process, have in the past produced the best arguments for taking the responsibility for threat

description out of military hands. Now is the time to face these facts, and to take the attitude and the necessary steps to correct the situation.

One has little difficulty in arguing the need for good tactical intelligence among military professionals these days. One prime lesson learned in Vietnam was the fact that superior military force cannot be brought to bear in the absence of good intelligence. The Army has acted and is still acting vigorously to insure that good tactical intelligence will be available to commanders in all levels of warfare. However, we are concerned here with an area about which there is less agreement—strategic intelligence.

Strategic intelligence is that which is used to make strategic decisions. This fact is often lost sight of among planners and decision-makers. There is a tendency to think of intelligence gathered by Washington-controlled resources as "strategic" and that gathered by the commands as "tactical" or "operational" intelligence. This is nonsense. If intelligence is used to make tactical decisions, it is tactical intelligence; if it is used to make strategic decisions, it is strategic intelligence. The means by which it is collected is quite beside the point. For example, in 1950, when front-line troops reported the fact that the Chinese were crossing the Yalu, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea, but strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. On the other hand, knowledge of a new surface-to-air missile in country X is strategic intelligence to national planners but it is tactical intelligence to any air unit which may operate in the area.

It is extremely important to get this matter straight. If we don't, we will continue to have expensive bureaucratic squabbles about intelligence resources, based on spurious arguments about control echelons. Commands will jealously guard intelligence resources on the grounds of "tactical" intelligence requirements and Washing-



After the well-publicized 'missile gap' failures of the late '50s, the position of the uniformed services in national intelligence matters went into a long decline. The pendulum is now swinging back, particularly in the critical area of estimating the strength of potential enemies.

By Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham

tion intelligence agencies will fail to see that their refined "strategic" collection systems are producing a great deal of tactical intelligence, neglecting the need for quick dissemination to the commands.

The definitional dilemma is compounded somewhat by tactical decisions that are often made in Washington. This fact of military life today means that military intelligence organizations in Washington find themselves hip-deep in the tactical intelligence business, traditionally the purview of commanders in the field. Further, there is the unfortunate tendency among intelligence producers and users to associate the term "strategic" exclusively with intercontinental nuclear-strike matters. For instance, you would find few intelligence officers in the targeting business who would not consider their product "strategic" intelligence. In fact, it is not; it is essentially tactical intelligence stored up against the contingency of executing the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan).

The general conceptual confusion between tactical and strategic intelligence is jeopardizing the commanders' control of their intelligence assets. But a more serious intelligence problem, in my view, is the danger of the military profession as a whole losing the function of defining the military threat for the national leadership. The basic problem is one of confidence in the military intelligence product within the services, the Department of Defense and the other departments of government.

The intelligence products of greatest impact in the national decision-making arena are the estimates. These contain the intelligence which most heavily influences strategic decisions. They are usually predictive in nature, pulling together basic order-of-battle, technical, doctrinal, economic and political intelligence to describe overall military postures of foreign powers. The estimates project military threats from the present out two, five and ten years. Military planners are heavily de-

pendent on these estimates in force structuring, force development and weapons development.

It is in this area that we military professionals have been in danger of losing our shirts to civilian agencies. To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion among decision-makers, in and out of the DOD, which regards threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented and generally inflated. This gives rise to a tendency to turn to some other source for "objective" threat assessments. The suspicion exists not only with regard to broad strategic estimates—for example, trends in the manned bomber threat—but to such detailed military estimates as the ability of the Soviet field army to sustain itself in the field under various assumed levels of combat. The trend toward independent analysis has been gathering over the past ten years and there are now analytical staffs in the civilian intelligence community paralleling those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on almost every military intelligence subject.

The responsibility for this situation to a large degree rests with the military side of the house, not with the civilian agencies. The lack of confidence in the threat estimates emanating from military intelligence agencies which caused users to request outside opinion in the early 1960s, is fully understandable. It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed "bomber gap," "missile gap," and "megaton gap." These and other seriously inflated estimates of less notoriety have hung like albatrosses around the necks of military intelligence officers ever since.

In its first several years of existence, DIA was plagued by the prevalent notion, even in the DOD staff, that the agency could not be counted upon for an objective threat assessment. This suspicion was reinforced by the fact that DIA did not perform well in the estimating area. The agency was harried by a combination of birth pains and the burgeoning demands for essentially tactical



U.S. Air Force

A singular lesson of Vietnam was that superior military force avails little without good intelligence: 11th Armored Cavalry troops make ready to launch an assault on entrenched enemy forces northwest of Saigon after receiving intelligence and subsequent air support.

intelligence in support of Washington-level decisions on the Vietnam war. The estimates function simply muddled along until the Agency was reorganized in 1970 by Gen. Donald V. Bennett, USA. Meanwhile, planners and decision-makers had become accustomed to going elsewhere for their threat estimates.

At first blush, it would appear that the blame for this situation can be laid at the feet of intelligence officers—first in armed services intelligence agencies and then in DIA. But this is too simple; the military intelligence user must take his lumps as well. Too often the user has not been content with an objective judgment from his intelligence officer—he has wanted the answer that “supports the program.” While planner pressure on intelligence estimates is not nearly as blatant or widespread as some quarters would contend, there has been enough of it to make it tough to regain full confidence in the military intelligence effort.

In the service staffs the fact that the position of the intelligence chief is a notch under the other key staff chiefs almost invites planner pressures on intelligence. It takes a pretty tough-

MAJ. GEN. DANIEL O. GRAHAM, a 1946 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, now deputy director for estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency, has served in several posts in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, and commanded the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion in U.S. Army Pacific. In Vietnam he was chief of the Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, in the office of J2, U.S. Military Assistance Command.

minded assistant chief of staff for intelligence to defend an estimate that runs counter to the well-laid plans of the rest of the general staff. In some ways, planner pressure is worse when it arises in the joint staff arena. Planners of all services “coordinating” an intelligence estimate are quite capable of reducing it to lowest common denominator mush. There are still some “old hands” in intelligence who are so inured to yielding before user pressures that they automatically produce threat estimates designed to please, or at least certain not to offend. These types are getting fewer, but they still exist.

When intelligence yields to consumer pressure, it cannot remain credible. When intelligence estimates are reduced to bland judgments acceptable to all planners, it is difficult to justify the expensive outlay of resources to collect intelligence. Such inoffensive pap can be produced without evidence.

Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture outlined above has brightened measurably over the past few years. The stature of intelligence estimates produced by the military has increased considerably and the accusations of bias have abated. Several factors account for this: DIA pulled up its socks and put proper emphasis on the estimates job; a new crop of more professional, less conformist intelligence officers is available for estimating work and, most important, there is a new appreciation of the intelligence function among our military customers.

The Defense Intelligence Agency was reorganized in November, 1970. One of the key changes was the establishment of a separate directorate charged with the production of defense intelligence estimates. One of the prime reasons for this move was the fact that there was, practically speaking, no way to discover the views of the DIA director on important estimative matters. DIA views were submerged in the text of national estimates (NIE's) prepared at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and coordinated with all Washington intelligence agencies, or in the text of joint estimates which were coordinated with the service planners. The only exception to this rule was the rare dissent to a national estimate when a specific view of the DIA director was noted at the bottom of the page. DIA's institutional anonymity was, in large part, a product of the original service objections to the creation of the agency. “Running with the pack” was the one way to avoid collision with the individual services. It was bureaucratically much safer to have any substantive argument be between a service and the “intelligence community” than between a service and DIA. The trouble was that this attitude put civilian agencies in the position of final arbiters of any disagreements inside DOD on threat definition.

The new DIA directorate for estimates permitted proper attention to the estimating function.

Under the old setup, the estimates job was under the directorate for production, which was also charged with answering the daily intelligence mail. The heavy demand for current intelligence on Vietnam, the Middle East and other crisis areas was too urgent and too time consuming to permit much effort on the more scholarly problem of estimates. The new directorate created an adversary process on substantive issues *within* DIA. The estimators, who must defend DIA views in the DOD and national intelligence arena, frequently challenge the results of analysis from the other DIA directorates. This necessary friction causes key intelligence judgments to be thoroughly scrubbed internally, ensuring that DIA won't find itself out on a limb defending a weak argument of some single analyst, a situation which prevailed all too often under the old setup.

The new crop of analysts and estimators available to both the service intelligence offices and to DIA are indispensable to a new effort to regain respectability for military threat estimates. Intelligence specialist programs within the services—and here the Army must be singled out as having the most effective program—are paying off in the form of real professionals capable of making objective assessments of the evidence on hand and defending the intelligence product among their fellow officers. On the civilian side, the new generation of analysts who have entered DIA are not afflicted with an overriding defensive attitude about service intelligence opinions. Many of the old hands used to react with arguments about the DIA “charter,” rather than counter differing intelligence views with good substantive analysis.

In the long run, however, the most telling factor in the improvement of military intelligence estimates is the increasing awareness among consumers that the only useful intelligence is objective intelligence. There was a time when the rule-of-thumb for acceptability of threat estimates among planners was “the bigger, the better.” Intelligence estimates which failed to maximize enemy threats in both sum and detail were likely to draw fire as “wishful thinking.” More often than not, military intelligence people came to heel under such criticism and stumped hard for the “worst-case” view. These old attitudes are waning now and simplistic demands for the scariest possible threat estimates are much less prevalent among users. Some hard lessons have been learned.

Military planners have seen some unfortunate results of inflated estimates over the past several years. With regard to Vietnam, it became painfully obvious that “worst-case” assessments of enemy capabilities by Washington estimators gave the erroneous impression that the more casualties we inflicted on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the stronger they got. When theater intelligence tried to offset this by stressing the evidence of the telling effects of Allied operations



U.S. Army

In 1950, when front-line troops reported that Chinese forces were crossing the Yalu River, it was tactical intelligence to all levels of command in Korea; it was strategic intelligence to Tokyo and Washington. Here, U.S. 2nd Division troops climb aboard a tank as they withdraw following an attack by Chinese Communist forces in December, 1950.



U.S. Air Force

Officers in the targeting business generally regard their product, such as this analyzed aerial photo of Hanoi railway yards and POL targets, as strategic intelligence. Others contend it is more usually tactical intelligence.



In 1970 Gen. Donald V. Bennett reorganized DIA in order to produce better intelligence, particularly in respect to threat estimates.

on the enemy, the effort was branded as a lot of unwarranted, policy-oriented optimism. In February, 1968, the communists corroborated the estimate that they were in desperate straits by launching the militarily disastrous Tet offensive. That fact was overlooked by almost everyone, however, most preferring to believe the new gloomy estimates (later proved grossly overstated) that the VC, although defeated near the cities, had "taken over the countryside."

Many Pentagon planners have also learned that "worst-case" estimates can be used to squelch military programs just as easily as to support them. A proposed program can be made to look like a total waste if its opponents are given free rein to postulate the size and sophistication of future threats to the system. Overestimates of future Soviet strategic missile capabilities killed the U.S. counterforce strategy at least four years before the strategy became invalidated by real Soviet capabilities.

The advent of arms limitation agreements sharply underscored some additional problems of inflated intelligence estimates. The "horse-trading" aspect of these negotiations raises the very real possibility of trading off actual friendly capabilities for enemy "capabilities" existing only on paper in our own intelligence estimates.

These examples lead to another important point that is beginning to be understood in military planner circles: Estimates of future enemy forces and hardware are by nature estimates of *intent*—not just of *capability*. The old arguments about "capability versus intent" are heard less now in DOD. It remains true that intelligence should emphasize capability in descriptions of current and near-future enemy forces. But the minute you tackle the usual problem of estimating enemy forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future, you have entered the realm of intent. For example, since World War II the Soviets have never, to our knowledge, deployed forces or fielded hardware as fast as their total capability permitted. To estimate that they would do so with regard to some weapon system or type of force in the future would make little sense. Indeed, all estimates of future Soviet forces derive from an attempt to discern what part of their total capability the Soviets *intend* to use in military programs and

which programs they *intend* to emphasize. This is not a very difficult-to-fathom verity of intelligence estimating. It is remarkable how long it has taken some of our military users to wise up to it.

While not all users of intelligence in DOD have learned the pitfalls of trying to make intelligence "fit the program," most have. Today there is a much improved market for objective intelligence judgments and this is a most hopeful sign in the field of military intelligence. When we get to the point where the strategic intelligence officer knows that his prime customers are going to raise the same amount of hell about overstatement as about understatement of threats, the objectivity of intelligence estimates will be almost automatic.

Objective intelligence is a goal to be devoutly pursued by the entire military profession. However, an important word of caution is in order: An objective intelligence judgment is not necessarily a valid judgment. Validity depends on the evidence available to the intelligence people and the quality of the analysis applied to that evidence. Any planner or decision-maker not convinced that there is good evidence and good analysis behind an intelligence judgment should feel perfectly free to reject it. And the intelligence officer should not get his nose out of joint if his product is not always accepted as gospel. However, the user cannot insist that the intelligence officer recant and change his best judgment. If he does this, he corrupts the whole system.

To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the "missile-gap" days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates. While there will always be a legitimate reason for independent judgments from outside DOD on issues of critical importance to national decision-makers, there is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies. The best assist the Army can give to such an effort is to insist on objective strategic intelligence, cooperate with DIA in producing it, and put good officers in the strategic intelligence field.

Pecking Order

An old soldier who saw service during the days of the horse cavalry tells about the time at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., when a sergeant and a private he knew were on a wagon detail from a bivouac area to a nearby farm.

Several guard points had been set up on the road leading out of the field training exercise area in which the bivouac was located and at each the sergeant driving was challenged. To each "Who goes there?" he would reply:

"Sgt. Jones and wagon with horse manure and a private."

The passenger said nothing the first two times, but as they approached the third and last barrier, the soldier asked respectfully:

"Sergeant, when you talk about the wagon this time, how about putting me first?"

LT. COL. TOM HAMRICK
U.S. Army, retired

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AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	FUNCTIONS	NAME	DATE:
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File of biographic data on Gen. Daniel O. GRAHAM				HS/HC-873 ✓

ABSTRACT

Biographic and assignment data concerning Gen. Daniel O. GRAHAM

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